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Abstract: 
Freedom and equality are important aspects of our self-conception as democratic 
citizens. Spinoza recognizes that these ideals also shape our thoughts about ourselves 
as human beings, and shows in his Theological-Political Treatise how the democratic 
state allows us to realize that self-conception. While Spinoza scholars continue to 
puzzle over what freedom means in the Theological-Political Treatise and how 
democratic political freedom relates to the ethical freedom of the Ethics, similar 
attention has not been given to equality. Although many believe that Spinoza endorses 
equality in some way, little has been said about the kinds of equality he discusses and 
how and why he endorses them. Here I argue that because Spinoza takes human 
beings to have unequal power, he takes them to be of unequal moral status (in the 
sense of ethical goodness), and his theory of democracy is not based on a concept of 
moral equality. Democracy, for Spinoza, gives rise to political equality, which frees 
us to become more powerful and generates the useful image of equal respect, but does 
not necessarily cause people to increase their power or moral status. The kind of 
equality that, for Spinoza, encourages human beings to become ethically free is 
economic equality, as I show with reference to the example of the Hebrew state in the 
Theological-Political Treatise and Spinoza’s remarks on economic exchange and the 
passions in the Ethics. 
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Introduction 
Freedom and equality are important aspects of our self-conception as democratic 
citizens.1 Spinoza recognizes that these ideals also shape our thoughts about ourselves 
as human beings, and shows in his Theological-Political Treatise how the democratic 
state allows us to realize that self-conception. Both there and in the Ethics, however, 
Spinoza shows that the majority of human beings most of the time conceive 
themselves erroneously, according to imaginaries both personal and collective.2 While 
genuine freedom can be achieved by the wisest, the unfree majority live under the 
illusion of their own freedom, understood as free will or free choice: an illusion which 
the state may promulgate in order to maintain peace. Spinoza scholars continue to 
puzzle over what freedom means in the Theological-Political Treatise and where 
democratic political freedom sits on the spectrum from illusory free will to the true 
ethical freedom of the Ethics.3 
 Similar puzzles have not generally arisen over equality, perhaps because 
equality is not named as a human good in the Ethics. Many commentators think that 
Spinoza is against inequality in at least some forms, and some assume that his concept 
of democracy includes an endorsement of equality.4 The Theological-Political 
Treatise appears to support this assumption: a democracy is a state in which “all 
remain equal, as they had been … in the state of nature”, and is to be preferred to 
monarchy in part because no one can tolerate being ruled by their equals.5 Within a 
democratic state, the law is obliged to treat people as equals and defend their right 
equally, and the Hebrew state prospered partly because of its egalitarian practices.6 
Even these few examples suggest that Spinoza’s sense of equality is not uniform, and 
that he draws on different kinds of equality including equal political right, equality 
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under the law, and economic equality. I want to stress that Spinoza’s appeals to 
equality are actually rather ambiguous, and – like his appeals to freedom – are 
complexly entangled with the philosophical positions of the Ethics. I will examine 
Spinoza’s remarks about the state of nature and the civil state, and argue that while 
the political equality gained in a democracy frees us to become more powerful, it does 
not necessarily cause people to increase their power or virtue. I then turn to Spinoza’s 
example of the Hebrew state in the Theological-Political Treatise, and his remarks on 
economic exchange, charity, and the comparative passions in the Ethics, to argue that 
it is economic equality that, for Spinoza, encourages human beings to become 
virtuous and ethically free. 
 
 
The inequality of reason 
 
A problem concerning inequality is at the core of Spinoza’s Theological-Political 
Treatise: ‘Everyone without exception can obey, not merely the very few – very few, 
that is, in comparison with the whole human race – who acquire the habit of virtue by 
the guidance of reason alone’.7  
The nature of the problem is illuminated by Spinoza’s Ethics. Spinoza 
establishes there that people will always differ in rationality, virtue, and freedom. 
These three are bound together because they all reflect the extent to which we bring 
about our own thoughts and actions. To reason is to think according to a sequence of 
true ideas that is essential to and follows necessarily in the human mind, which we 
discover and recover through experience.8 (By contrast, to imagine is to think 
according to contingent chains of confused ideas established by empirical associations 
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between external things.) Virtue “is the very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he 
has the power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the 
laws of his nature alone”.9 Virtue increases the more we strive and are able to 
preserve our being and to act according to what we rationally know our essence to be. 
(By contrast, lack of virtue is neglecting to preserve our being or to strive for it, due to 
being overpowered by external things, and is correlated with imagination and reactive 
affects.) As reason increases, we understand our own essence better and what is good 
for it, and we strive to achieve what is good for us, increasing our virtue. As we think 
and act more autonomously – according to our nature rather than according to the 
sway of fortune – we become more free: “that thing is called free which exists from 
the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone”.10 (By 
contrast, to be “enslaved” is to be overwhelmingly determined by one’s circumstances 
and one’s reactive affects.) Spinoza is clear that the route to greater reason, virtue, and 
freedom is not straightforward. Everybody is subject to external things and the 
entwined images and feelings they cause.11 Our material circumstances can encourage 
or constrain our success, meaning that our power to determine our own thoughts and 
actions fluctuates constantly as it is more or less affected by external things.  
Due to differing circumstances and fluctuating fortunes, people are not equal 
in the extent to which they develop reason, virtue, and freedom. Only very few will 
become highly virtuous and rational, and even they are subject to the diminishment of 
those goods in bad circumstances. By contrast, everyone has an equal capacity to act 
in accordance with virtue, regardless of their understanding of the reasons for it, by 
following models and obeying laws. One of the questions guiding the Theological-
Political Treatise is how society should be organized given that people can be equally 
obedient but not equally rational. How can all people be led to act uniformly in the 
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interests of peace and stability, given that they do not (and will never) think or feel in 
harmony with one another?12 
Spinoza’s response is that behaviour should be tightly legislated, but that 
thought and speech cannot and should not be.13 Obedience is best inculcated through 
the institution of a universal faith. In the Ethics, Spinoza argues that God is equivalent 
to nature and is to be rationally understood rather than worshipped. But only the 
wisest will come to understand God in that way. Human societies are made up 
primarily of the less rational – the more imaginative and reactive – and all will benefit 
from a system that guides their behaviour to approximate true virtue through 
narratives and feelings of devotion. Spinoza’s universal religion accommodates a 
range of historically and culturally variable beliefs and practices; what is crucial is its 
core tenet that love of God demands obedience to the law to love one’s neighbours.14 
This “divine law” of the old and new testaments is best for encouraging virtuous 
behaviour because it is also a law of human nature: it is truly virtuous to act for the 
advantage of other human beings.15 Whether we grasp this law through rationally 
understanding our own nature or through imagining it to be a divine commandment is 
less important than that we obey it through our actions.  
We love our neighbours by showing them justice and charity, a practice that 
encourages peaceful societies even if rationality in the population is low.16 To be a 
good person involves rationality, virtue, and freedom; to be a good citizen involves 
only obedience to the law to love one’s neighbours. In a democracy, Spinoza defines 
justice as fairness or equity, assigning to each person what belongs to him according 
to civil law, and “to treat all as equal, … not begrudging the rich or despising the 
poor”.17 At a minimum, if the law to love one’s neighbours is to be universally 
followed, then each person deserves to receive the love of his or her neighbours. 
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While the precise content of that law must be determined by each society, its form 
indicates that each person merits a fair distribution of neighbourly love, irrespective 
of that person’s wealth or standing in society. This suggests that Spinoza’s democracy 
involves the principle that all people are equally valued and respected. We might call 
this a principle of equal dignity, or moral equality: it is a principle on which we take 
modern democracy to be founded, and it may appear that it is at the heart of Spinoza’s 
idea of democracy too.18 That principle, however, seems to conflict with Spinoza’s 
conviction that some people, namely the more rational ones, are better and more 
valued than others. How does Spinoza understand equality to function in a 
democracy? 
 
Democratic equality 
 
Moral equality is not part of our essence and does not follow necessarily from our 
nature; unlike earlier natural law theorists and later Enlightenment philosophers, 
Spinoza does not think that our capacity for reason makes us equal in a moral sense.19 
The Ethics suggests that human beings have a formal sameness which does not imply 
moral equality. I take this formal sameness to be grounded in a shared formal essence 
– the eternal blueprint of human being that follows from the essence of God, or nature 
– which gives us a common set of basic physical and mental capacities. Our common 
physical capacities mean that all human individuals have the same basic body-plan, 
while our common mental capacities mean that every human being is able to reflect 
its body in thinking. The mind, for Spinoza, is nothing more (and nothing less) than 
the idea of the body: it is not a rational being that could be said to have any special 
value or moral status. Furthermore, formal essence cannot be isolated from its 
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actualizations in existing human beings and their circumstances. People are, and 
always will be, unequal in their rationality, virtue, and freedom – the only qualities in 
which our moral status could be said to reside, for Spinoza. So while a basic human 
sameness distinguishes us from other kinds of individuals, it does not make us equally 
worthy of justice or respect; nor does our humanness give us any special value in 
nature. If moral equality is a feature of Spinoza’s system, it follows in the democratic 
state from our following the divine law, and is not the foundation for our doing so. 
People are equally able to be good citizens by following the divine law, and are 
consequently treated equally as citizens under civil law. Yet Spinoza also suggests 
that we are “equals” in the state of nature, prior to the development of democracy, 
law, or citizenship.20 If we are not by nature morally equal, then what is the basis of 
this natural equality? In the state of nature, Spinoza says, “everyone exists by the 
highest right of Nature” and “each individual thing has the sovereign right to do 
everything that it can do”.21 This follows from the fact that in the state of nature, the 
sovereign power is nature itself. According to Spinoza’s metaphysics, nature’s power 
is equivalent to God’s power and to “the power of all individual things together”. To 
the extent that an individual has power within nature, it has the sovereign right to do 
what its power determines it to do: “the right of each thing extends so far as its 
determined power extends”.22 By “right” Spinoza does not mean an entitlement, but 
the essential power of a thing to be what it is and strive for what is good for it.23 Thus 
God’s (or nature’s) right is the power “by which he and all things are and act”, and an 
individual’s right is the power (conatus) by which it strives to persevere in its being.24 
The power, and thus the sovereign right, of individuals is not equal in nature: big fish 
eat little fish, and “we recognize no difference between human beings and other 
individual things of nature” in this respect.25 People in different circumstances 
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encounter different helps and hindrances to sustaining and enhancing their being. 
Accordingly, people’s power to survive and seek their advantage differs and varies 
over time. The rational person who understands her nature has the power and the right 
to act according to the laws of her nature, while someone who lacks this 
understanding has the power and the right to live according to the demands of his 
appetites.  
It is unlikely that anyone will achieve much rational understanding in the state of 
nature. Nobody is born understanding the laws of their nature, and the state of nature 
is not conducive to gaining it. In conditions where “anyone … is permitted by the 
sovereign right of nature to desire anything that he believes to be useful to himself [… 
and] is permitted to take it for himself by any means”, people’s thoughts and actions 
will be overwhelmingly determined by the need to survive and by passions of fear, 
hatred, and anger.26 Spinoza demonstrates in the Ethics that such a situation is 
detrimental to the development of reason and virtue, partly because people who are 
determined by their passions have little in common with each other, and thus few 
opportunities to understand human nature or to unite to increase their power.27 Any 
reason and virtue a person manages to develop will be precarious, as that person 
continues to be subject to external threats and the unchecked desires and passions of 
others.   
A kind of equality does, nevertheless, characterize human life in the state of 
nature. The state of nature is not organized around rational human interests but is 
determined by the powers of all individual things together. Accordingly, human 
beings are equally subject to the ‘numberless things that concern the eternal order of 
the whole of nature, of which human beings are but a small part’.28 In the state of 
nature one lives according to the sway of fortune and external causes, and is largely 
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unable to determine oneself. So freedom is fairly equal, since everyone is unfree. 
Furthermore, this regime treats human beings with no special value and gives them no 
special rights. From the perspective of God or nature, human interests are of no 
greater worth than those of lions or viruses: they take precedence only to the extent 
that humans exercise greater power. The human species is equal to other species, and 
a human individual is equal to another individual, in that its right is strictly 
concomitant with its power. In this sense, humans are equal in their intrinsic 
valuelessness. Finally, since everyone in the state of nature “decides what is good and 
what is evil from his own temperament”,29 everyone who manages to act for their own 
advantage is equally “good”. A more rational person’s interests and actions (to 
acquire what she needs through mutual aid) are of no greater value, and are no better, 
than those of the ignorant person (to acquire what he needs by deception or murder). 
Since reason, virtue, and freedom are universally low in the state of nature, 
their more equal distribution does nothing to enhance human flourishing. Evidently, 
being equal to others in these respects is not, in itself, good for us. Moreover, these 
equalities indicate a lack of proportion between a person’s power and her goodness. 
For Spinoza, a person’s goodness consists in the extent to which she has been able to 
“perfect” herself to think rationally, act virtuously, and live freely according to her 
own nature. This gives a person a moral status which increases as her power, or 
conatus, increases: “by virtue and power I understand the same thing”.30 One way in 
which the state of nature is bad for human nature is that this equation is disrupted. 
Where virtue is universally low, and where goodness is defined by each individual in 
terms of the satisfaction of his needs, everyone’s moral status is roughly equal. A 
more powerful person will gain material advantages such that he will be stronger and 
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longer-lived: he may be a better person on his own terms, but he will not be a better 
person in the human ethical sense set out in the Ethics.  
It is only in a human state, organized according to human interests, that this 
disproportion is addressed. Under conditions that protect us from danger, regulate 
human interaction, and direct our behaviour to the general human advantage, we have 
opportunities to work together to understand human nature and to become more 
powerful in ways that lead us to being ethically better people. The purpose of the state 
is “to free everyone from fear … [and] allow their minds and bodies to develop in 
their own ways in security and enjoy the free use of reason”.31 The state gives us the 
“freedom” – in the sense of protection from the damaging effects of other powers – to 
become more free in the ethical sense, and thus to become ethically better and 
increase our moral status. This will not happen universally: within the political space 
of freedom, many are still enslaved in the ethical sense. Due to people’s different 
conative powers and circumstances, some will become better and others will not. This 
leads to differences in people’s value for society. Those who are more powerful here 
are also more rational and virtuous, and are more useful to one another; such people 
are more highly valued, at least by those who rationally understand what is most 
valuable for human beings.32 In a democracy, inequalities in power rightly give rise to 
proportionate inequalities in moral status. 
In a democracy, people escape enslavement to their circumstances and become 
subjects of a collective self-governing power that they form themselves. In contrast to 
Hobbes, individuals transfer their natural right to society without thereby losing it, 
because they share their power with that of others in a much bigger power. “In a 
democracy no one transfers their natural right to another in such a way that they are 
not thereafter consulted but rather to the majority of the whole society of which they 
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are a part. In this way all remain equal as they had been previously, in the state of 
nature”.33 In what sense are democratic citizens equals? First, they are as equal as 
those in the state of nature in the sense that each person is equally subject to a much 
more powerful whole. Second, they are equal in the new sense of having equal civil 
right: each one trades in his natural right for an equal stake in the collective whole. 
This equal stake is not based on the intrinsic moral equality of persons, but on a 
revocable agreement to collectivize and share natural right. Democracy is this 
collectivized sovereign right. Each person is an equal share of the sovereign right, 
while retaining his natural right (conative power) through which he seeks his 
advantage within the constraints of civil law.  
The transfer of right thus introduces a distinction between power as right and 
power as conatus which did not exist in the state of nature.34 It is a condition of a 
democracy that the former is equalized so that the latter is “freed” to develop itself as 
best it can. Our moral status can grow and flourish in a democracy; but it can also 
diminish and languish if we lack the resources and opportunities to develop it. 
Potentially, a large gap may open between those who are better enabled to flourish 
and those who are less so. Having freed people to increase their power, pursue ethical 
freedom and improve their moral status, the state is not obliged to redress inequalities 
in the extent to which people actually attain these goods. A democracy seeks to 
exercise its own conative power to the advantage of the whole; that is, it aims to 
persevere in its existence and grow stronger. It acts for security and stability, not for 
greater equality. The state may decide to distribute or redistribute goods to minimize 
disparities in power and moral status, but if it does so, its purpose is not to equalize 
those goods but to increase the power of the whole.  
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The equalization of right does not ensure moral equality, but it does allow for the 
performance of equal respect. Justice is “to have no respect of persons, but to treat all 
as equal, and equally to defend the right of each individual”.35 Equal right ensures the 
political and legal equality of democratic subjects.36 Because it gives equal access to 
justice and charity, everyone is perceived to be equally entitled to be valued and 
respected. But this perception is illusory, since people are truly valued on the basis of 
their moral status which is not equal, and which the democratic state has no obligation 
to make equal. One state might find it most useful to improve its whole population, 
and redistribute educational resources from the most powerful to the least in order to 
achieve higher levels of reason across the board. Another might find that peace and 
stability are best achieved by maintaining large disparities of moral status, valuing its 
more virtuous citizens more highly and explicitly giving their interests greater weight 
(as in Plato’s Republic). Some states might find it useful to perpetuate the illusion of 
moral equality to satisfy people’s self-conceptions and desire for recognition, and 
prevent envy and resentment.37 Although democracy allows us to treat everyone as if 
they were equally respected, it does not take the real moral equality of persons to be a 
grounding assumption or an aim. This is one of many ways in which Spinoza’s 
concept of democracy is distant from our own. 
Rational people recognize that they are superior to, and more valuable for 
humanity than, the ignorant. But the ignorant do not necessarily recognize the 
superiority of the rational: taking their own self-interest to be all-important, they think 
of themselves as morally equal to everyone else. It may therefore be difficult to 
persuade them to follow laws determined by others: “there is nothing that people find 
less tolerable than to be ruled by their equals and serve them”.38 For this reason, the 
civil authority must be seen to be superior to its subjects. The state should be a 
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democracy ruled by a collective whole which is, by definition, superior in power and 
value to each of its parts: “all are subject to themselves and nobody must serve their 
equal”.39 If it is not a democracy, a state should be ruled by one or several people who 
have “something above ordinary human nature”, or who can convince others that they 
do. Moses, in Spinoza’s example, was truly more rational and virtuous than his fellow 
Israelites, while the Romans derived their superiority from their purported divine 
lineage.40 
To summarize, Spinoza does not take equality to be an intrinsic feature of human 
beings or to be good in itself. Equality is good only to the extent that it promotes the 
flourishing of individuals and the strength and stability of the state. Democracy 
introduces legal and political equality which “free” us to unequally pursue greater 
rationality, virtue, and ethical freedom. The equal moral status of citizens may be 
imagined by the populace but is neither assumed nor desired by the wise, who aim to 
increase the moral status of as many individuals as possible. This leads to a new 
question: does Spinoza think that equality has a role to play in the rational aim to 
make more people better people? What kinds of equality promote the flourishing of 
individuals and communities, on Spinoza’s view?  
 
Equality in the Hebrew state 
 
Spinoza discusses equality extensively in chapter 17 of the Theological-Political 
Treatise, where he moves from the theoretical discussion of democracy to the 
practical example of the Hebrew state under Moses. Spinoza’s example is not 
accidental. The late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries saw a “Hebrew revival” 
in Protestant republicanism, theorists of which upheld the Hebrew state rather than the 
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Roman republic as exemplary.41 In the wake of the Reformation, “readers began to 
see in the five books of Moses not just political wisdom, but a political constitution 
[;…] a set of political laws that God himself had given to the Israelites as their civil 
sovereign”.42 Political writers drew on rabbinical interpretations of the “Hebrew 
republic” and presented it as the divinely ordained model state. Things went even 
further in the seventeenth-century Dutch republic: representing their independence 
from Spain in terms of the struggle of the Batavians against Rome, the Dutch adopted 
the Hebrew state as their own foundation myth. From political tracts to poetry, plays, 
and the decoration of town halls, “the United Provinces figured as the New Israel, and 
its constitution was represented as a revival of the divine law given to Moses”.43 
Petrus Cunaeus’ De republica Hebraeorum of 1617, the first such text to draw on 
Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, was particularly influential in establishing the Hebrew 
state as a constitutional model for the Dutch. While for Cunaeus Hebrew history 
shows that monarchy is contrary to God’s plan, other writers – including Grotius, 
Calvin, and Hobbes – interpreted it differently to support a range of political views.44 
Spinoza wrote for a Dutch republican audience thoroughly familiar with the 
political uses of the Hebrew state. He is sceptical about its potential to serve as a 
direct model for the Dutch Republic: “no one can now imitate [the Hebrew state], and 
it would not be wise to try to do so”. Nevertheless, it has “numerous features that are 
… well worth noticing, and which it would perhaps be very wise to imitate”.45 Two of 
these features, also stressed by Cunaeus, are the equal sovereign right of the Israelites, 
and their economic equality resulting from the “agrarian law”. One of Cunaeus’ 
particular contributions to the literature was his explicit analogy between the land 
laws described in the Bible and the Roman agrarian laws designed to periodically 
redistribute public land.46 Republicans who favoured the Roman model opposed the 
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redistribution of property and wealth; Cunaeus countered that by establishing an 
“agrarian law” among the Israelites, God had mandated such redistribution. Cunaeus 
used the Hebrew state to argue not only that all legitimate constitutions are 
republican, but that all legitimate republics should adopt principles of equitable 
redistribution.47  
Spinoza describes the Israelites emerging from enslavement in Egypt and finding 
themselves in a state of nature, with their natural right fully restored to them. On 
Moses’ advice, they agreed to transfer their right to God and promised to obey God’s 
law alone.48 The Israelites made God their sovereign and sole lawmaker, thus creating 
a state in which civil law and religion were one and the same. Although their state 
was apparently a theocracy, this was “more opinion than reality”, because it was 
based on an imaginary conception of God.49 God, truly understood, is not a legislator 
or a party to contracts; that characterization was a useful fiction. In imagining God to 
be their sovereign, the Israelites had unknowingly created a democracy: 
The Hebrews did not transfer their right to another person but rather all gave 
up their right, equally, as in a democracy, crying with one voice: “We will do 
whatever God shall say” (making no mention of an intermediary). It follows 
that they all remained perfectly equal as a result of this agreement. The right to 
consult God, receive laws, and interpret them remained equal for all, and all 
equally without exception retained the whole administration of the state. This 
is why, on the first occasion, they all equally approached God to hear what he 
wished to decree.50  
“God the sovereign” was a symbolic representation of the pooled power of the 
Hebrew people in which the people believed, and “God’s laws” were human civil and 
religious laws imaginatively attributed to divine revelation. In making themselves 
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equals under God’s law, the Israelites made themselves equal lawmakers, since “to 
consult God, receive laws, and interpret them” is to conceive laws imaginatively and 
to imagine God to have communicated them.51 As long as the Israelites continued to 
imagine that God was their legislator, they in fact maintained their own sovereign 
right. 
The Israelites had the collective power to imagine their own constitution and 
laws and to perpetuate the fiction of theocratic rule to maintain obedience. But the 
disadvantage of thinking imaginatively is its close connection to the passions. The 
Israelites evidently imagined and felt passions “with one voice”: upon all equally 
approaching God to hear the law, they were terrified to the point of death. Perceiving 
Moses’ superior wisdom, they made him the sole consultant to God.52 In this second 
transfer of right, Moses assumed the right to interpret and enforce the law, not as a 
king but as a sovereign representative of God (i.e. of the people’s pooled power). Now 
the Israelites “lost absolutely every right” to make law and choose their form of 
government, and were equal only in the sense of being “equally subject” to the 
sovereign.53 But the sovereign was really their own pooled power which had been 
loaned to Moses, and they were really subject to themselves. 
 The repetition of the word “equal” in these passages indicates its importance 
in Spinoza’s description of the Israelites’ political transitions. In a democracy 
everyone has equal civil right, but a society in which everyone equally makes the law 
is not practicable when people are ruled by their passions.54 In this situation, equality 
will not lead to a flourishing society; it is better to concentrate legislative authority in 
one superior individual who borrows and represents the equal right of the people. To 
transform a fearful and ignorant mass into a stable and peaceful community, Moses 
had to inculcate obedience in every aspect of public and domestic life, from the order 
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of religious ceremonies to the way they cut their hair.55 These strict behavioural 
controls made it possible for the Israelites to build a flourishing society and provide 
the conditions in which a person could “live under the guidance of reason with his 
whole mind”. In making themselves subject to the command of the sovereign, they 
freed themselves to pursue their own ethical freedom: “a subject is one who does by 
command of the sovereign what is useful for the community and consequently also 
for himself”.56 
 Moses’ position as sovereign representative was not inherited. He bequeathed 
to the Israelites a theocracy in which legislative and administrative responsibilities 
were divided so that no one person held sovereign right. This led to a federation of 
equal, autonomous territories united under one God.57 A key element of the state’s 
prosperity was its egalitarian distribution of goods. The temple was built at collective 
expense and “belong[ed] to all”. The territory of the Canaanites was divided equally 
among the twelve tribes who invaded it. The citizens “held an equal portion of the 
lands and fields with the leader”.58 Most important was the law that required land to 
be returned to those who had been compelled to sell it. 
Nowhere else did citizens hold their possessions with a stronger right 
than this state’s subjects. They held an equal portion of the lands and 
fields with the leader, and each one was the perpetual owner of his 
share. If anyone was compelled by poverty to sell his estate or field, he 
had to be restored to it again when the Jubilee came around, and there 
were other customs of this kind to ensure that no one could be 
dispossessed of his allotted property. Nowhere could poverty be more 
tolerable, than where it was a matter of the highest piety to practice 
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charity towards one’s neighbour, that is, towards one’s fellow-citizen, 
so that God their king would continue to look with favour upon them.59 
The restitution of land in the Jubilee (forty-ninth) year, a divine requirement set out in 
Leviticus, was Cunaeus’ “agrarian law”.60 Spinoza stresses that land was distributed 
equally and to the perpetual ownership of the people. Those forced to sell their land 
had it restored to them (or their descendants) in the Jubilee year. To sell one’s land 
was to enter into a debt which carried a guarantee of future cancellation so it could not 
devolve onto the next generation. The “other customs of this kind” Spinoza mentions 
likely include the sabbatical law which required other debts to be released every 
seventh year.61 Unpaid debts could not be met with seizure of land or enslavement, 
but had to be periodically forgiven. The success of the Hebrew state was partially 
attributable to the fact that equal ownership of land and freedom from debt were 
effectively inalienable rights there. 
 This point is not original to Spinoza, and by the time of the Theological-
Political Treatise its deployment in the Dutch republican context was already half a 
century old. Nelson explains the history of the republican uptake of the sabbatical and 
Jubilee debt-releases, arguing that while earlier writers appealed to these Biblical 
laws, Cunaeus most powerfully established their connection to the peace and security 
of the state.62 He posited the Jubilee restitution as the archetypal “agrarian law”, 
indicating that permanent, equal land ownership and debt cancellation were God’s 
will. For Cunaeus, the elimination of economic inequality is to the benefit of the state. 
The greed of the rich and the indebtedness of the poor put the poor at the mercy of the 
rich and leave them unable to access basic goods: “the avarice of a few should not 
invade the possessions distributed with so fair equality. It is not unusuall with rich 
men to thrust the poor [man] out of his inheritance, and deprive him of necessaries, 
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whilst they enlarge their own estate superfluously”. This situation prompts the poor to 
defection, sedition, and revolt.63 The “agrarian law”, in creating greater economic 
equality, promotes political stability.64 
 Spinoza reinforces Cunaeus’ point by reiterating that obedience to civil and 
religious law was one and the same. For the Israelites, to practise “charity towards 
one’s neighbour” through cancelling debts was to obey God’s law, and was thus a 
matter both of justice and of piety. As Nelson points out, there is no distinction in 
Hebrew between “justice” and “charity”: the Hebrew tzedakah “refers both to the 
fulfilment of what we would regard as conventional legal obligations and to the 
performance of what we would regard as charitable acts”.65 Since God is the owner of 
all things, all his requirements of human beings with respect to his land, including 
those that look discretionary, have the character of legal obligations.66 Tzedakah 
encompasses the obligatory repayment of debts and the (no less obligatory) charitable 
cancellation of debts. By fulfilling tzedakah, the Israelites met the overarching 
requirement of the divine law: to love their neighbours. In this way, they performed 
both justice and charity, perpetually enacting equal treatment and respect. Although 
all were not equally wise, all were equally obliged by and beneficiaries of tzedakah, 
and thus all were treated as equals. Neither debt nor domination could enslave anyone 
to anyone else: “no one was subject to his equal, each being subject only to God”.67 
 By contrast, inequality characterized the decline of the Hebrew state. The 
priestly Levites became a “non-labouring elite” resented by the others, who were 
obliged to pay them with donations and taxes. The tribes became less unified, leading 
to strife, the violation of the divine law, and eventually the institution of a 
monarchy.68 This separated civil from divine law and disrupted the tribes’ equal rights 
and the peoples’ equal land ownership. Although Spinoza does not mention it, the 
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Bible and Talmud suggest that the violation of the land laws, including the Jubilee 
restitution, was characteristic of this period.69 As regards equality, Spinoza’s message 
seems clear: the Hebrew state was most stable and its people flourished best when its 
confederated tribes had equal right, and its people enjoyed economic equality. Under 
these conditions, and through a strict code of behaviour enforced through religious 
devotion, the state was able not only to free its members to become better people, but 
actually to make them better people too.  
 
Charity and economic equality 
 
Spinoza does not imply that the equalities established by the Hebrews will necessarily 
lead to flourishing. Those equalities were appropriate for the conditions the Hebrews 
found themselves in; different socio-political circumstances demand different 
strategies. Nevertheless, as I will show in this final section, Spinoza suggests that 
enforcing economically egalitarian principles is precisely how modern states should 
legislate for charity.  
Unlike justice, which Spinoza defines in chapter 16 of the Theological-
Political Treatise, charity is not explicitly defined. It is clear that by charity Spinoza 
does not mean personal philanthropy. Care for the poor, along with other matters of 
the observance of piety, is to be decided upon and undertaken only on sovereign 
authority in the interest of the state.70 The exercise of charity is no more a matter of 
individual discretion than the exercise of justice, and someone who attempts to 
dispense charity as an individual, against the legislation of the state, acts seditiously. 
This rule is supported by principles of human nature in the Ethics. Philanthropy is 
often motivated by pity, a passion in which we imitate the sad feelings of others and 
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thereby diminish our own power; it is also linked to ambition, our desire to be 
esteemed for doing what pleases others.71 Acting from such feelings is not virtuous or 
free, and it weakens the recipient by making their wellbeing dependent on the feelings 
of others. Generosity may be used to gain advantages of social harmony and 
friendship, but no private person has the wealth to help everyone in need, or the 
power to unite a community. Only the state has these powers, “so the care of the poor 
falls upon society as a whole, and concerns only the general advantage”.72 Charity is 
not a matter of the fortunate volunteering to help the less fortunate, but a legal 
obligation on everyone to help everyone else (tzedakah). 
 It is a law of human nature that it is good for people to help one another. 
Nobody can survive very long without the help of other human beings, and we 
flourish best when we work together – preferably amongst rational people – for 
everyone’s advantage. Mutual aid enables people to increase their conative power by 
“provid[ing] themselves much more easily with the things they require”.73 One form 
that mutual aid takes is economic exchange. Each of us requires many more things for 
the preservation of our bodies and minds than we can procure alone, and “money has 
provided a convenient instrument for acquiring all these aids”.74 Another such 
instrument is credit and debt. Economic transactions take place on the basis of “virtual 
credit” where money is scarce or unavailable: the butcher keeps track of what the 
shoemaker owes him on the assumption that he will discharge the debt in the future 
when he needs a pair of shoes. Such systems also operate where money is 
inappropriate: a friend invites you to dinner on the tacit understanding that you return 
the favour at some point.75 Through both monetized economic exchange and credit-
and-debt relations we help one another to fulfil our needs; both are ways that humans 
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work together for mutual advantage and build the communities through which we 
increase our reason, virtue, and freedom. 
 As with all forms of community-building, these relations are fraught with 
danger due to inequalities of reason. Spinoza remarks on economic exchange in 
Ethics IVP70 and P71: “A free man who lives among the ignorant strives, as far as he 
can, to avoid their favors”.76 The problem is that the (ignorant) creditor’s estimation 
of the value of his favour may be unequal to the (rational) debtor’s estimation. The 
rational person “strives to join other men to him in friendship, not to repay men with 
benefits which are equivalent in their eyes”: rational people help one another because 
they recognize that it is a law of their nature to do so, and thank one another with 
friendship and mutual love. Less rational people are likelier to be motivated by 
money, or by the prospect of receiving a benefit they perceive to be of equal value; 
“thankfulness” for them always takes the form of “a business transaction or an 
entrapment”.77 Since it is rational to help one another, the rational person receives 
benefits and services on the understanding that she will thank the creditor by 
exercising her friendship whenever he needs help. She acts honourably on virtual 
credit, and does not expect to repay her debt financially or immediately, or with added 
interest. The creditor, who lacks understanding of the inherent benefit of mutual aid, 
expects repayment in coin or in kind, and may hate the debtor if she does not 
discharge her debt in the way he expects. 
For Spinoza, a virtual credit system of mutual aid, in which honourable people 
help and show gratitude to each other as needed, fits better with human nature than a 
system that monetizes every favour. But since we cannot deal exclusively with 
rational people, “it often happens that it is necessary to accept favors from [the 
ignorant], and hence to return thanks to them according to their temperament”.78 The 
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peaceful exchange of benefits is the primary way in which we seek our advantage and 
that of others in a community. To facilitate this, money must be used universally to 
set agreed values to goods. As the intermediary between need and fulfilment, money 
becomes the universal object of desire: “its image occupies the mind of the multitude 
more than anything else”.79 It is through and around money that we build a 
community: to acquire money, people must integrate their needs and aims, working 
with and for others, and interacting as buyers and sellers.80 These relationships, 
mediated by the image of money and the desire for it, are highly susceptible to 
passions of ambition, envy, pride, and despondency. To foster peaceful and stable 
economic sociability, conditions must be set to minimize these passions. 
Ambition, envy, pride, and despondency are passions through which we 
compare ourselves to others, aligning our desires with theirs, comparing our joys and 
sadnesses in fulfilling them, and consequently thinking more highly or lowly of 
ourselves (or of others) than is just.81 Since money is universally desired and its image 
is foremost in most people’s minds, and since it is involved in many interpersonal 
interactions, that image will always be associated with these passions. Economic 
inequality causes us to compare our power for desire-fulfilment with that of others, 
and to feel either proud or despondent – in either case diminishing our power.82 
Spinoza’s formula for overcoming passions is to dissociate the feeling from the image 
we take to cause it,83 but money cannot be dissociated from desire without destroying 
its function. A more realistic strategy is to dissociate the passions from our tendency 
to imagine other people’s successes and failures in seeking their advantage. For the 
irrational majority, it is best if the state creates conditions that discourage such 
comparisons of powers from ever occurring.  
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The state can do that through a more equal distribution of money. A good that 
is held in common does not arouse envy; if everyone has equal ability to acquire what 
they need, and no prospect of their needs being either over-indulged or marginalized,  
the most damaging comparative affects will be avoided. Economic equality also 
reinforces the performance of equal respect: being able to fulfil their desires to the 
same extent as others, people think of themselves as equally powerful and their 
interests as having equal weight. Income, prices, interest rates, and taxes should 
therefore be organized to facilitate economic equality in the interests of the stability of 
the state.84 Legislation against debilitating debt and exploitative employment must be 
instituted so that no one is subject to those he perceives to be his equals. The state 
legislates for charity by introducing systems through which people can benefit each 
other, maximizing their capacity to become ethically free, and minimizing their 
tendency to fall prey to harmful passions.  
A good democratic state for Spinoza is one that aims for peace, stability, and 
strength through increasing the power of its constitutive citizens – which is to say, 
their reason, virtue, and freedom. But given the imaginative and passionate thinking 
of the majority, and given their misconceptions of their own power and what is good 
for it, it is preferable if people do not focus too much on the level of power they, or 
others, have achieved. The state is faced with a difficult balancing act: it must 
simultaneously encourage each person to increase her conative power, and encourage 
her to think of her conative power as equal to everyone else’s. This balance is 
achieved through a combination of political equality enforced by justice, which opens 
the space in which people are able to increase their power; and economic equality 
enforced by charity, which provides the material conditions in which people actually 
do increase their power. For Spinoza, the right combination of equalities allows 
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political freedom to give way to ethical freedom, such that the good citizen can also 
become a good person. 
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